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Abstract
The widespread adoption of the energy justice framework notwithstanding, arguments o↵ered have not
been able to provide tangible definitions of su cientarianism and energy mobility. Considering widening
disparities on what constitutes su cient energy (electricity) access between the global north (North America,
Europe, Australia) and the global south (sub-Saharan Africa, SSA), this paper highlights the influence of
’western reality’ on the energy narrative. This paper also attempts to propose a model that evaluates
o↵-grid electrification projects (in the global south) and their ability to guarantee su cientarianism by
examining the prospects of such projects in providing connected households access (energy security and
sustainability of energy supply) and mobility (transition from a lower to higher energy level through the
purchase of additional electrical equipment). Furthermore, this paper explores and provides arguments
on energy bullying (by industrialized nations on developing countries mostly in SSA) while also o↵ering
suggestions for improvements in Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects. In essence, this paper
formulates the endemic problems of energy access and energy mobility (plaguing the global south) as a
justice problem and further provides insight into the exacerbation of injustice and bullying exhibited by the
global north. Examples from South Africa have been utilized as case study.
Keywords - energy justice; su cientarianism; energy access; energy mobility; energy bul-
lying.
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Highlights
X Identifies varying narratives to su cient energy access and mobility.
X Identifies the e↵ect of western narrative on national energy policies.
X Critiques commitment of the global north to mitigating emissions.
X Provides policy discussions to improving su cient energy access and energy mobility.
1 Introduction
Dominant western energy narratives mean that we lack appropriate, context sensitive definitions of “su cient”
energy and “energy mobility”. In drumming up support for the adoption of renewable energy technologies in
the global south, the global north has failed to highlight the continued contribution of ’dirty energy’ sources
to sustaining its own economy as well as the internalised benefits of research and development (R&D) for
alternative energy sources. This approach is usually encouraged by public news outlets, which fail to account
for renewable energy potential, electricity demand, and the e↵ects of seasonal climatic variance on energy
provision, amongst other factors [see Nield 2016; Coren 2016; Neslen 2015; Sims 2016; Walker 2017]. What is
more, these narratives are extremely influential. Western accounts of renewable energy provision influence their
policies on investments in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), the primary case study used throughout this paper, for
instance. Indeed, according to the main United States development finance institution, the Overseas Private
Investment Corporation (OPIC) prefer mainly to invest in solar, wind and other low-emissions energy projects
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(Lomborg 2014). As a consequence, over the past five years, the OPIC has invested in more than 40 new energy
projects, for which all but two were in renewables. Positive on the one hand, such approaches are open to
critique. Bjorn Lomborg, the president of the Copenhagen Consensus Centre, stated, for instance, that “... if
Obama spends the next 10 billion on gas electrification, he can help lift 90 million people out of poverty. If he
only uses renewables, the same 10 billion can help just 20 million - 27 million people. Using renewables, we will
deliberately choose to leave more than 60 million people in darkness and poverty... (KFF 2014).” Arguably,
then, the wholesale promotion of renewables can be a perverse approach and an act of “energy bullying”,
without consciousness of what it means to have energy su ciency and energy mobility. We position this as a
fundamental energy justice challenge.
Against this background, the paper argues that the current energy justice framework is not yet complete.
Among the academic literature, we identify reluctance from energy justice scholars to establish tangible defi-
nitions of what constitutes su cient energy access, a failure that may be influenced by the “access connotes
su ciency” narrative. This narrative finds support in the divergent view between the global north and the
global south on energy poverty. While energy (fuel) poverty in the global north is about a↵ordability (i.e.
the ability of households to a↵ord su cient energy for adequate heating), in the global south, energy poverty
is a problem of accessing clean energy sources for domestic uses. Thus, in the global north, su ciency is a
problem of the “ability to purchase”, inherently implying that homes connected to the grid can access as much
electricity as possible if they are willing to pay. This narrative is consistent with the ideal of fuel poverty where,
as Katsoulakos (2011) outlines, expenditure beyond 10% of disposable income on energy (fuel) connotes energy
poverty and World Bank (2017) figures, which show that electricity access for the EU is 100%, while for the
OECD countries it is 99.92% (as of 2014). In contrast, for the global south, access to clean energy sources
is comparatively low (less than 40%) and poverty levels are very high, especially in SSA where the figure is
about 41% of the population (Baurzhan and Jenkins 2016; World Bank 2017). Thus, energy poverty in a global
south context is a “problem of access”. This ideal is supported by the dual causal link between energy and
poverty, which leads to low energy demand (especially in rural areas (DME 2009)) and the fact that electricity
consumption is a function of both the ownership of electrical appliances and duration of usage (Monyei and
Adewumi 2017, p.308). Households in the global south are thus forced to exploit other means of accessing
energy sources like firewood and liquid petroleum gas, which do not o↵er the same quality when compared to
grid electricity. As a result, for non-grid homes in South Africa, over 47% are evaluated to be energy poor
(using 10% of household disposable income as benchmark) (DOE 2012a).
In short, global energy and climate policy formulation is heavily construed in favour of the global north.
Alongside being historically and currently responsible for the majority of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, the
global north is also the major player in the conceptualization and formulation of climate change mitigation
policies. This is not without issue. According to Moner-Girona et al. (2016), the Clean Development Mech-
anism (CDM) under the Kyoto Protocol of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC) permits industrialized countries (Annex I countries) with GHG reduction commitments to ’o↵-
shore’ investments in emissions reducing projects to developing countries as an alternative to costly reduction
3
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
strategies “back home”. The extent of CDM’s usefulness is controversial, with widespread debate surround the
ability of CDM projects in developing countries (non-Annex I countries) to guarantee su cient energy access
and energy mobility (Lim and Lam 2014). Millock (2013) outlines that debatable issues include the low-hanging
fruit argument, transaction cost, and contribution to sustainability, amongst others. As an illustration, Costa-
Jnior et al. (2013) evaluate the contribution of 75 CDM projects for technology initiatives and the promotion of
cleaner technologies in Brazil, showing that not more than 21% of the projects led to implementation of cleaner
technologies. This led to the conclusion that CDM projects in Brazil have not encouraged a cleaner model of
development.
In addition, the absence of a penalty framework that fines Annex I countries who fail to meet pre-determined
emissions reduction targets has further contributed to lack of commitment to ensuring that more active steps
are taken to increase the roll-outs of CDM projects with verifiable contributions to improvement in quality of
life and sustainability. This view is supported by Barkindo (2006) who outlines that the developed countries
did not support initiatives preceding the Kyoto Protocol agreement announcement, but rather converted to
’mechanisms for investment’ such as the compensation fund and the Brazilian proposal for a clean development
fund. The developed countries have thus eliminated measures that would demand sustained commitment to
the increased development of sustainable energy projects in developing countries. A case in hand is Germany’s
default on its emissions reduction target, which would attract no penalty or fine (news24 2017).
In light of this background, this paper makes several arguments: (1) that existing energy justice frameworks
have not su ciently explored concepts of energy su ciency and energy mobility; (2) that the Global North has
engaged in energy bullying by promoting renewable energy in the Global South while continuing to develop fossil
fuels; (3) as a result, that South Africa’s o↵-grid electrification policy is flawed; and (4) that o↵-grid projects in
the global south should make use of features like hybrid solar-diesel technology which would give these projects
greater value in providing su cient access and in accommodating users’ needs when energy demands increase
over time. Following an introduction to the basics of South African energy policy, each section of our paper
further develops each of these points in turn.
2 South African energy policy: An introduction
To begin, we provide an intentionally brief introduction to the South African energy policy case study referenced
throughout this piece, necessary to give context to the empirical material that follows. With attention to the
United Nations (UN) Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 7 and 11 (UN 2015), and in mitigating the e↵ects
of the planned decommissioning of ageing power plants (Njobeni 2017), Eskom, a South African electricity
public utility, has recently stepped up its construction of additional electricity supply capacity (Eskom 2015).
The accelerated e↵orts by Eskom coincide with the energy crisis that has plagued South Africa since 2008,
leading to massive blackouts, load shedding and huge economic losses (Shezi 2015; Kohler 2014). This rapid
electrification program has seen electrification rate move rapidly from less than 33% (in 1990) to 58% (1996)
and 90% (2016) and has succeeded largely due to various government policies and interventions (Marquard et al.
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2007).
Yet in terms of the socio-economic background of the population, evidence suggests that electrification rates
remain deeply uneven between di↵ering ethnic groups and across urban and rural areas. For instance, across the
South African provinces, household electrification rates for Black African, Coloured households, Indian/Asian
population group varies significantly with 54.14% of Black African households electrified compared to 47.87%
for Coloured households, 59.29% for Indian/Asian households and 77.40% for White households (STATSSA
2015). According to the DME (2009) this necessitates government responsibility for ensuring the electrification
of all its citizens, and especially the rural poor, in order to improve living conditions.
As a step towards achieving universal access to electricity by 2019, the free basic electricity (FBE) policy
was introduced in 2004 to completely subsidize 50 kWh of electricity monthly for the very poor households
connected to the grid (GNESD 2018). This is in line with the 1998 energy policy White Paper, where emphasis
was placed on households access to adequate energy services for cooking, heating, lighting and communication
(DOE 2012b). In addition, the Non Grid Electrification Policy Guidelines identify non-grid solar home systems
(SHS) as a suitable temporary alternative to grid electricity for rural, poor and o↵-grid homes. In order to
extend this electricity access, energy service companies (ESCO), concessionaires and service providers act on
behalf of the Department of Energy (DOE) to roll out SHS delivery DME (2009).
According to the DME (2009), the SHS, which are being introduced now, should produce about 250Wh
daily and power a black and white television (for 4 hours), lighting (4 hours), portable radio (10 hours) and
phone charging points daily. The implication of this is that on average each o↵-grid rural poor home gets 7.5
kWh monthly from the SHS. Yet, as this paper goes on to argue, this scheme is ethically flawed, and, echoing
failures of the energy justice literature, overlooks key issues of western energy bullying.
3 The limitations of the energy justice approach: Su ciency and
mobility
The increasingly popular energy justice framework faces a major limitation: it fails to engage with definitions
of “su cient energy” and “energy mobility”. Yet, as our introduction has shown, this is entirely necessary as
existing notions of energy access have focused on problems faced by the Global North, and they have tended to
overlook problems of su ciency and energy mobility that are significant concerns in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)
in particular. Here we introduce this limitation. The concept of energy justice is already a much-researched
topic with the energy and social science literature, seeking to establish a nexus between energy in terms of
generation and delivery on the one hand and justice (taken to be synonymous with equity/fairness) on the other
(Jenkins et al. 2016). Islar et al. (2017, p.671) define it as “respecting universal human rights and ensuring that
every person has a right to the level of energy required to attain a minimum level of well-being”. In keeping,
Sovacool et al. (2017a) present energy justice as a global system that is both representative and impartial, and
fairly distributes the benefits and costs of energy services.
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As an outline of the debates it presents, Sovacool and Dworkin (2015) suggest that energy justice can take
on conceptual, analytical and decision-making roles. In presenting energy justice as an analytical tool, Sovacool
and Dworkin (2015) outline an energy justice framework that helps in understanding how values can be built
into energy systems. Conceptually, Jenkins et al. (2016) lay out a three-tenet framework in which the tenets
of distributive justice, procedural justice and recognition are used as a means of understanding energy justice
dilemmas. Through both, energy justice is then described as playing a role in assisting the energy decision
process and choices of consumers and energy planners by presenting itself as a useful decision making tool. As
an illustration of the application of such approaches to date (of which there are many), Bouzarovski and Simcock
(2017) recognise the implicitly spatial nature of distribution, procedure and recognition and include this spatial
dimension in their conceptualisation of energy poverty as a form of injustice. He↵ron et al. (2015) present
energy justice as the solution to the Energy Trilemma, whereas Islar et al. (2017) evaluate the national energy
policies of Nepal by applying key aspects of the energy justice framework to show the feasibility of geopolitical
and biophysical constraining factors in the implementation of just energy policies. As a final example, Yenneti
and Day (2016) qualitatively evaluate the distributional justice concerns in the implementation of a large-scale
solar park in India. These seemingly disparate examples are united by a shared concern for the social justice
implications of energy infrastructure and use, and demonstrate that the energy justice framework is a widely
applicable and successful one.
Yet despite its success, there are failings in the energy justice literature and its application. A critical
examination of the energy justice framework as proposed by Sovacool and Dworkin (2015) shows that while
arguments are pro↵ered for the principles of (1) availability (bordering on energy security, energy su ciency
and reliability of energy source), (2) a↵ordability (encompassing stable and equitable prices), (3) due process
(ensuring active community participation), (4) good governance (promoting access to information and establish-
ment of transparent frameworks for preserving that access), (5) sustainability (promoting frugal utilization of
resources that minimize waste and negative impact on the environment), (6) intra-generational equity (distribu-
tive justice between di↵erent communities), (7) intergenerational equity (distributive justice between present
and future generations) and (8) responsibility, tangible expressions have not been provided to the following:
what constitutes su cient energy of high quality and beyond energy access, and how do electrification projects
guarantee energy mobility for connected households? We address each in turn.
3.1 What constitutes su cient energy of high quality?
Considering the widening gap in terms of quality of life (QoL) between residents in the global north (North
America, Europe, Australia) and the global south (sub-Saharan Africa, SSA), as well as the varying weather
conditions these regions experience, it becomes obvious that energy requirements vary. What, therefore, con-
stitutes the “minimum energy access” (kWh/month/individual) that is capable of meeting the basic needs of
an individual? A review of literature on energy justice framework shows vagueness around a definition of su -
cient energy access. Also worrisome is the translation of this vagueness into policies that countries in SSA are
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deploying in ’mitigating’ energy poverty. Considering the low access to electricity in SSA (71.6% in the urban
areas and 15.3% in the rural areas), Solar Home Systems (SHS) have been adopted by most SSA countries in
order to increase electricity access for o↵-grid rural communities (Baurzhan and Jenkins 2016). Yet despite the
widespread penetration of SHS in rural communities, there has been no noticeable reduction in rural periph-
eralisation1. Indeed, according to (Baurzhan and Jenkins 2016) there has been little or no e↵ect of SHS on
poverty alleviation at all, with 727 million people in SSA still relying on traditional biomass and charcoal as
their primary cooking fuel.
Evidence of the SHS’s failures to decrease poverty burdens is further corroborated by (Urmee and Md 2016),
who posit that end-users expectations of SHS and the performance of these SHS did not match, especially
in terms of load capacity and hours of utilisation, where most end-users had expected grid quality electricity
levels. Overall, this evidence implies that the increasing widespread use of SHS has not significantly improved
electricity per capita (kWh) for SSA which, according to Baurzhan and Jenkins (2016), is about 511.90 kWh
compared to an average of 3064.50kWh for the world. Nor has there been any significant contribution of SHS
to GHG emission reduction.
As was briefly introduced above, in order to reach the goal of achieving universal access to electricity by
2019 in South Africa, the Free Basic Electricity (FBE) policy was introduced in 2004 with the aim of completely
subsidizing 50 kWh of electricity monthly for the very poor households connected to the grid (GNESD 2018).
This action is in line with the 1998 White Paper on energy policy, where emphasis was placed on households’
access to adequate energy services for cooking, heating, lighting and communication (DOE 2012b). Similarly,
for o↵-grid poor homes, the FBE enables a 250Wp SHS per home. In this context, while it may be argued that
the poor o↵-grid homes have been provided ’access’, the disparity and injustice in the distribution of resources
between poor homes that are grid connected and o↵-grid is obvious. Further, while grid connected poor homes
are guaranteed stable electricity supply (up to 50kWh/month) with “no limit”2 on peak demand and usage of
electrical appliances, o↵-grid poor homes are placed entirely at the mercy of weather conditions and have their
peak demand capped (maximum inverter capacity). Finally, o↵-grid poor homes with SHS are not guaranteed
stable power supply and have a limited range in terms of choice of electrical appliances. Our argument here is
that a failure to define “su cient access” or “su ciency” is leaving some social groups unfairly burdened.
3.2 Beyond energy access, do electrification projects guarantee energy mobility
for connected households?
Another lacuna observed in the principles proposed by the energy justice framework is the absence of energy
mobility thinking. By energy mobility we do not mean transport from energy, but the ability of households to
increase their energy demand due to an increase in the number of electrical appliances they own or extnsion in
usage of already owned electrical appliances. While it may be argued that the availability principle encompasses
1By rural peripheralisation we extend its meaning beyond Sovacool et al. (2017b) to mean discrimination in quality and quantity
of electricity access to households of the same income bracket due to their proximity to the national grid.
2no limit for grid connected homes does not imply infinite loading. While electricity consumption is a function of ownership of
electrical appliances and duration of use, maximum demand from a house is limited by the ampere (current) rating of its connection.
Typical houses under the FBE are 20 A connected which means that at any time, maximum current that can be drawn is 20 A.
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energy mobility, the vagueness around the above question raises doubts. Arguably, the FBE policy that advo-
cates for the implementation of SHS in o↵-grid poor homes boosts rural peripheralisation and caps electrical
appliance ownership by households. Considering the fact that most poor rural homes cannot a↵ord the SHS
(which are subsidized heavily by the government), it follows that upgrading the SHS - increasing the number
of photovoltaic (PV) panels, increasing inverter capacity, increasing storage etc., may not be a↵ordable for the
poor households. Furthermore, considering the fact that the value of the SHS depreciates, non-upgrade of these
SHS leave households poorer (energy-wise) year-on-year. The result is a vicious cycle: according to Azimoh
et al. (2017), electrification cannot solve the entirety of the developmental problems plaguing rural households,
and households cannot access development assistance opportunities without having access to electricity. In ad-
dition, since productivity is linked to electricity access and with over 55.5% of households in South Africa poor
(STATSSA 2017), and 47% of non-electrified households in South Africa experiencing energy poverty (DOE
2012a), the need arises for concerted and robust arguments capable of precipitating policies that guarantee poor
households energy mobility in addition to access to a minimum quantity of energy (electricity). At the moment,
energy justice scholarship has not engaged with this challenge.
4 Flawed policy and energy bullying: Evidence of key findings
In this section we address the assertion briefly covered in the introduction, that the Global North has engaged
in energy bullying by promoting renewable energy in the Global South while continuing to develop fossil fuels.
We then further outline that as a result, South Africa’s o↵-grid electrification policy is fundamentally flawed.
According to Valer et al. (2017), 45kWh/month/household is currently the minimum for any electrification
project that aims to receive funds from the Conta de Desenvolvimento Energetico - CDE. The 45kWh/month
per household is evaluated and based on the assumption that it is the minimum energy required for lighting,
communication and refrigeration. This value is similar to the 50-100kWh/year/person for basic energy needs
referenced by Sovacool et al. (2012, p.718) (if average household size for o↵-grid rural households is estimated at
4 persons/household) and the FBE allocation of 50 kWh/month for poor grid connected households, outlined
above. Yet these figures are not being reached in some instances. Here we explore why.
4.1 On electricity consumption and population size
Figure 1 from World Bank (2017) shows the population of the OECD, EU and SSA countries, including that
for Germany, South Africa and Nigeria from 1971-2016. It is seen from Figure 1 that across the years under
consideration, growth rate has been uniform (and almost constant) for South Africa, Germany and EU countries,
with steep growth rates observed for Nigeria, SSA and OECD countries. However, as shown in Figure 2,
electricity consumption (kWh/capita) is highly varied (World Bank 2017). For example, in 2014 electricity
consumption per capita (kWh/capita) for Germany with a population of 80,982,500 was 7,035.48, while for SSA
with a population of 978,625,082 it was 483.12 (with a significant portion of that due to South Africa’s use).
An implication of this is that Germany with a population growth of 3.4% between 1971-2014 has increased
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electricity consumption by 73.1%. This is in contrast to SSA with population increase of 225.8% and electricity
consumption increase of 51.6%. Whilst this is a perhaps unsurprising figure, it is one worth repeating. The
consequence of the low electricity consumption for SSA has led to increased poverty (estimated to be 41%
of the population (World Bank 2017)) in the region, which has further decimated electricity access. In turn,
this low energy (electricity) access reduces the quality of life (QoL) of households and forces them to explore
alternative energy sources like firewood which exposes residents to diseases such as childhood pneumonia, chronic
obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), and lung cancer from smoke emanating from these alternative energy
sources (Baurzhan and Jenkins 2016). We seek to demonstrate here, the serious implications of insu cient
energy policy gains.
4.2 On dirty energy and sustainable growth and development
The OECD countries are the major drivers of clean energy initiatives worldwide, with the EU at the forefront of
international e↵orts towards a global climate deal (EU 2017). From the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) to the Kyoto Protocol and then the Paris Agreement, developed countries
(particularly within the EU) have been setting ambitious plans to reduce GHG emissions significantly below
1990 levels. However, despite e↵orts geared towards reducing the use of energy polluting sources for electricity
generation, a prominent dirty energy source has continued to play a major role in the overall electricity generation
mix of the OECD countries: coal. IPCC (2007) outlines that the largest 15 countries (including the EU-25 as
one) make up 80% of global GHG emissions. Within those, Figure 3 (a and b) shows that coal exploitation
in electricity generation for the OECD countries still makes up about 31% (as at 2014) of the total generation
mix, producing over 3,000 TWh of electricity (as of 2014) compared to over 2,000 TWh in 1980 (EIA 2017).
This represents about a 50% increase in utilization of coal between 1980-2014. This dirty, albeit cheap source
of electricity has fuelled development and sustained the ’green’ economies of the developed nations.
Doubts thus arise over the sincerity of these developed countries (OECD/EU) in mitigating GHG emissions
considering their historical responsibility (IPCC 2007) and current contribution to GHG emissions. Germany
(which, according to DW (2017), is poised to miss its 2020 climate target by up to 7%) currently produces
about 40% of its electricity from coal. As Figures 4a and 4b show, this represents just around 16% drop in
coal utilization between 1980-2014. According to news24 (2017), “Merkel has opposed stricter EU emissions
limits for cars, fought planned diesel bans in cities su↵ering toxic air pollution and shelved a plan to get one
million electric vehicles onto German roads by 2020.” This is further corroborated by the inability of Merkel
to form a coalition majority government owing to her disagreement with bold cuts to coal power generation
(Oltermann 2017). The fallout of this double standard is energy bullying and inconsistency in policy formulation
and implementation. For this paper, we define energy bullying as attempts by developed countries in the global
north to force developing countries (especially in the global south) to adopt electrification options that suit
the (predominantly renewables focused) narrative of the developed nations, thereby ensuring the reliance of
developing nations on technical expertise from the developed nations. This occurs through stifling policies on
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loans, financing, aids and trade, amongst other mechanisms. On the whole, the electrification options being
adopted do not guarantee equity in electricity access for poor households in developing nations.
4.3 Energy bullying of the global south by the global north
The Nigerian finance minister was recently quoted (verbatim) to have said “We also do need consistency of
policies by the multilateral institutions and western countries. Let me give you an example. In Nigeria, we have
coal and there is power coal. It does not take a genius to work out what it will take to get coal fired power.
Yet, we are being blocked. I think there is some hypocrisy in that. We have an entire western industrialisation
that was built on coal-fired energy and that is the competitive advantage that has been used to develop Britain,
where I grew up. Now, Africa wants to do it, and they are saying it is not green. It means that we can not do
(coal) and that we should go and do solar (and) wind, which are the most expensive power projects. Yes, we are
going to have the narrative around infrastructure... but we must also make sure the playing field is level. The
west cannot say after polluting the atmosphere for 100 years, and when Africa wants to explore its resources,
they say no. If we want to stop coal, those who started it over 200 years ago, should first stop using coal before
telling us to stop. This is because by doing so, you are only pushing us to the cycle of underdevelopment”
(Amanze-Nwachuku and Chima 2016).
The decision by the World Bank to fund the construction of the Medupi power station, a coal-fired power
station being built by Eskom in the Limpopo province of South Africa, was greeted with public outcry especially
from the United States, Britain, the Netherlands, Norway and Italy (all OECD members) (Goldenberg 2010).
The criticisms notwithstanding, the bank’s decision was sequel to the energy crisis that was plaguing South
Africa (Shezi 2015). While coal can produce over 92% of South Africas electricity (as of 2014), in real terms, this
translates to 225 TWh compared to 259 TWh for Germany (45% for 2014) and 3,222 TWh for OECD countries
(31% for 2014). Figure 5 (a and b) presents electricity generation breakdown by source for South Africa from
1980-2014 (EIA 2017). As further history, while the United States (under Barack Obama) condemned the
World Bank’s decision to fund the construction of the Medupi power station (Goldenberg 2010), the same
United States (under Donald Trump) is pulling out of the Paris agreement to enable it to exploit ’dirty energy’
sources (especially coal) without strict caps on emission (DiChristopher 2017). This is no di↵erent to Germany’s
inability to meet its own reduction target (news24 2017). Due to their far-reaching global influence, developed
nations thus find it easy to renege on agreements relating to policy targets without repercussions (since they also
constitute the watchdogs). According to (Lomborg 2014), China lifted 680 million people out of poverty over
the past 30 years through cheap coal thus showing the strong connection between growth and energy availability.
It thus becomes immoral, unethical, unjust and a case of bullying when OECD countries that derive over 60%
of their energy from polluting sources (coal, gas etc.) decide to only fund renewable energy projects to increase
electricity access in Africa.
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5 Improving energy projects for su ciency and mobility
This section engages with the final argument of our paper, that in light of the critiques above, o↵-grid projects in
the global south should make use of features like hybrid solar-diesel technology which would give these projects
greater value in providing su cient access and in accommodating users’ needs when energy demands increase
over time. Considering the disparities in quality of life between the global north and the global south, the
proposals made for evaluating energy projects are confined to SSA.
In South Africa, the Non Grid Electrification Policy (DME 2009) is ethically flawed. This is because the
Non Grid Electrification Policy does not incorporate values into its delivery based on its non-consideration
of the e↵ect of weather variations across and within the provinces on SHS output, and secondarily based on
its basic electricity needs standard of 7.5 kWh/month/household. Furthermore, the Non Grid Electrification
Policy creates injustice in terms of electricity access between poor households that are di↵erentiated by grid
access. While poor households with a grid connection can access the most e cient source of lighting for all
needs including productive purposes, poor households with SHS are forced to heavily complement their energy
mix with alternative fuel sources like wood and LPG (Kaygusuz 2010). The additional expenditure by poor
households on alternative fuel and monthly surcharges for the SHS further impoverishes o↵-grid poor households.
Thus, while grid access limits free electricity consumption to 50 kWh/month/household (for poor households),
it o↵ers them energy security and guaranteed availability with no restriction on usage option (cooking, heating,
lighting and entertainment). We need a more appropriate alternative, based on an alternative vision.
In navigating the gap between descriptive and prescriptive claims outlined by Sovacool and Dworkin (2015),
the need arises for “realistic utopia” of what could be based on real world case studies from real world contexts.
For the purposes of this paper and with reference to the South African case, we define realistic utopia to be an
ideal setting in which households are responsible in meeting their monthly billing obligations, GHG emissions is
minimized (not necessarily eliminated), egalitarianism is constrained by the ownership of electrical appliances,
libertarianism is bounded by the ability of households to influence decision as regards usage of their electricity
allocation, utilitarianism is a function of improvement in quality of life as shown by improvement in productivity
or ownership of electrical appliances, and su cientarianism is limited by electrical appliances ownership and
ability to pay for electricity usage. This is, in essence, our guiding vision of an “energy just” setting.
Within this realistic utopia, energy sources must be able to provide households with consistent access to
energy (electricity). The grid connected poor households in South Africa are guaranteed availability under the
FBE. To remedy the most significant failing - availability for o↵-grid poor homes - we promote centralized
generation schemes backed up with diesel/petrol generators. These generators would provide regular interven-
tions during the day when high energy consuming appliances (electric cooker, electric kettle, pressing iron) can
be used. Further, during days of low solar irradiance, the generators can be run to augment for low power
production from the centralized SHS system. Of course, it can be said that the inclusion of the diesel generator
is “unsustainable”, but in keeping with the argument presented throughout, it is also a mode of achieving social
justice that should not be dismissed, especially as it has so long been used elsewhere (Azimoh et al. 2016). Still,
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to mitigate against climate change, an environmental surcharge that is a fraction of total household bill could
be applied to generate funds for increasing the availability of battery and the number of photovoltaic (PV)
panels. The billing of the system should be conducted in a way that guarantees sustainability and minimises
or decreases government intervention (subsidy). This can be achieved through a graduated billing system that
increases energy bills (with the consensus of the community) yearly at a fixed rate. We argue that CDM projects
(especially solar based projects like SHS) should also adopt hybrid configurations (SHS/diesel generators).
While the ability to achieve emission targets would be reduced due to the incorporation of the generators,
the executed projects are capable of greatly improving the quality of life of households, precipitating economic
growth and mitigating poverty. Arguments for the adoption of hybrid configurations that include fossil fuel
based sources stem from the fact that sustainable development cannot be achieved while the majority of the
population is still poor and has limited means by which to reverse this trend, as is the case for an estimated
55% of South Africans (STATSSA 2017) and whilst the global north shows an inability to reduce non-fossil
energy sources to below 60% of its generation capacity. With this in mind, the 50 kWh/month guaranteed grid
connected model for poor households is equivalent to about 8% of the total monthly consumption of an average
household (consuming 600 kWh/month). Su ciency is, however, guaranteed by the grid connection which
allows households increased consumption by purchasing more units. In contrast, su ciency is only guaranteed
for o↵-grid consumers through hybrid SHS/diesel generator schemes which enables households connected to the
hybrid schemes to increase the consumption of electricity up to a level through extended usage of currently
owned electrical appliances or purchase of new electrical appliances. Based on the scheduled intervention of the
diesel generator and our definition for a realistic utopia, households could have the operation time (start time
or period of operation) of their high electricity consuming devices slightly varied (utilizing artificial intelligence
(AI) tools) to ensure that peak demand is minimized.
Energy mobility for households can be construed as an index for measuring quality of life. Electrification
projects must thus be able to guarantee households the opportunity in migrating from a lower level of energy
consumption to a higher one through extended usage of electricity or increase in ownership of electrical appli-
ances. Grid connected houses under the FBE are guaranteed mobility due to the regular grid expansion model
employed by the utility in increasing electricity supply capacity. In South Africa, the Transmission Development
Plan (TDP) provides a guide as to how utility supply capacity is regularly increased to meet projected demand
growth (Eskom 2015). In contrast, the current Non Grid Electrification Policy does not guarantee energy mo-
bility for SHS connected households due to the high and prohibitive costs in expanding its capacity. As earlier
advocated, the incorporation of an alternative energy (electricity) generation source like diesel generators and a
centralized system of generation (rather than the conventional individual household approach) guarantees mo-
bility. With the incorporation of smart load dispatch algorithms, increasing demand motivated by the increase
in ownership of electrical appliances by households is easily resolved by optimally scheduling the dispatch time
of the high energy consuming loads during the scheduled intervention of the diesel generators.
In extending discussions on what constitutes su cient energy access and allowances for energy mobility to
CDM projects, we argue that these CDM projects must be able to o↵er similar quality of life to connected
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households in the developing countries to ensure justice. For example, it is unjust to assume that the GHG
emissions reduction of a unilateral CDM project by an Annex I country such as solar lighting for a remote
location or distribution of cooking stoves in a non-Annex I country would o↵er the same contribution to quality
if life as a fossil based project emitting same quantity of GHG in a developed country.
6 Conclusion
This paper has critically examined the dual problems of energy su ciency and energy mobility for the global
south using South Africa as a case study. We have identified the problem of vagueness in the definitions of these
terms, as well as proposed improvement for both conceptual and policy thinking. In so doing, this paper identifies
the disparity in narratives between the global north and the global south as to what constitutes su cient energy
access, energy mobility and as an outcome of both, energy poverty: issues that we describe as fundamental to
the energy justice challenge. These failings are routed in the persistent e↵ects of the ’western narrative’ on the
national energy policies of developing countries. We have evidenced this by identifying the emerging case of
energy bullying by the global north on the global south while also presenting cases of policy inconsistencies by
the global north especially on commitments to emissions reduction. Considering the huge technical gap between
the Annex I and non-Annex I countries and the role of CDM projects in precipitating sustainable developments
in non-Annex I countries, this paper advocates for the adoption of hybrid electricity generation systems with
alternative/complementary generation sources (diesel, gasoline) for CDM projects such as solar based electricity
scheme for remote locations in developing countries. Within the realistic utopia presented, it is argued that
the adoption of a hybrid and centralized electricity generation scheme would guarantee o↵-grid poor households
under the Non Grid Electrification Policy su cient energy access and energy mobility compared to what is
currently obtainable. In sum, the ’western narrative’ on energy must adopt justice principles in the execution
of CDM projects and the formulation of energy policies for investments in developing countries in order to
guarantee su cient access and mobility of households. It is only fair.
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Figure 2: Electricity consumption (kWh/capita) progression for selected countries and regions Bank 2017.
Figure 3: Electricity generation mix for OECD (a) from 1980 - 2014 and (b) for 2014 EIA 2017.
Figure 4: Electricity generation mix for Germany (a) from 1980 - 2014 and (b) for 2014 EIA 2017.
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Figure 5: Electricity generation mix for South Africa (a) from 1980 - 2014 and (b) for 2014 EIA 2017.
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